Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159503
Autor:innen: 
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 662
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider the joint effect of profit and Pigouvian taxation in a model of imperfect competition. We show that, when both profit taxation and Pigouvian taxation/subsidy are used, the former is no longer neutral. The two fiscal tools are substitutes, and for any profit taxation rate there exists a unique Pigouvian tax that entails the first best outcome as an equilibrium. Our analysis therefore suggests that policy makers in charge of different taxation policies should coordinate in order to optimally design the tax menu for firms.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
153.08 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.