Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159499
Autor:innen: 
Dragone, Davide
Lambertini, Luca
Palestini, Arsen
Datum: 
2009
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 658
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
The established view on oligopolistic competition with environmental externalities has it that, since firms neglect the external effect, their incentive to invest in R&D for pollution abatement is nil unless they are subject to some form of environmental taxation. We take a dynamic approach to this issue, using a simple differential game to show that the conclusion reached by the static literature is not robust, as the introduction of dynamics shows that firms do invest in R&D for environmental-friendly technologies throughout the game. Moreover, our setup also illustrates the existence of multiple equilibria, only one of which is identified by the corresponding static game.
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Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

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