Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159479
Authors: 
Andergassen, Rainer
Year of Publication: 
2008
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 638
Abstract: 
The present paper studies incentive provision in a model where a manager can affect the firm's stock price by exerting unobservable effort and through costly, deceptive signalling and investigates the role product market competition plays in shaping shareholders' trade-off between inducing effort and fraud.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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