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Erscheinungsjahr: 
2008
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 623
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
In a model of repeated Cournot competition under complete information, I show how the existence of a fringe of managerial firms affects the stability of a cartel of strict profit-maximizing firms. There always exists a critical dimension of the fringe that makes the cartel unstable, and this dimension is non-monotone in the total number of Örms. By appropriately selecting the dimension of the fringe, a policy maker can affect the equilibrium outcome. As an example, I consider the case of a domestic authority that is contemplating whether to allow entry of a fringe of managerial foreign firms in the domestic market to increase the competitive pressure, thereby enhancing domestic welfare.
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