Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159424
Authors: 
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2007
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 583
Abstract: 
We examine a vertically differentiated duopoly where firms invest in process and product innovation and then compete in prices under full market coverage. We show that (i) process and product innovation are complements (substitutes) for the low-quality (high-quality) firm; (ii) the firm which is initially more efficient invests more than the rival in process innovation; (iii) if the initial differential between marginal costs is sufficiently high, the demand for the less efficient firm is nil and the duopoly equilibrium does not exist.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
216.13 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.