Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159416
Authors: 
Bacchiega, Emanuele
Lambertini, Luca
Mantovani, Andrea
Year of Publication: 
2006
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 575
Abstract: 
We revisit Maxwell's (1998) analysis to show that MQS regulation has no effects on the high-quality firm's incentive to adopt a more efficient technology in a vertically differentiated duopoly with full market coverage and convex costs of quality improvements which are independent of the scale of production.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
151.56 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.