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Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
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Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 544
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
We illustrate two differential oligopoly games with capital accumulation where, alternatively, the accumulation dynamics of productive capacity is modelled either `a la Solow—Swan or `a la Ramsey. We show that in the first case the open-loop Nash equilibrium is only weakly time consistent, while in the second it is strongly so, although the Ramsey game is not state linear.
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