Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159381
Authors: 
Bono, Giovanni
Year of Publication: 
2005
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 540
Abstract: 
This work addresses the optimal design of the monitoring technology for a team when collective liability can not form. It shows that the principal's optimal design choice is then to concentrate monitoring on the less productive agent in a team. By controlling the less productive agent she fully discipline the more productive. This result helps in studying the interplay between the institutional set-up and the technological capabilities of teams
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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