Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159343 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2004
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 502
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
We consider a start-up firm which applies for a bank loan to implement a project based on complementary activities. The firm has the possibility to improve the complementarity effect by coordinating the activities. Coordination is costly and can be made either by using internal human resources or by hiring a consulting firm. In the former case the choice of coordination is not verifiable by the bank and a moral hazard problem arises, while in the latter information is symmetric. The role of consulting services is thus to mitigate the informational problem. Without consulting, the firm does not coordinate and either obtains no funding or the surplus of the project is not maximized.
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