Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159336
Authors: 
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 495
Abstract: 
We investigate dynamic R&D for process innovation in a duopoly where firms may either undertake independent ventures or form a cartel for cost-reducing R&D investments. By comparing the profit and welfare perfomances of the two settings in steady state, we show that private and social incentives towards R&D cooperation coincide for all admissible levels of the technological spillovers characterising innovative activity. This results stems from smoothing the investment reffort over the time horizon of the game.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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