Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159335
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 494
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is also socially efficient.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Working Paper

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