Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159330
Authors: 
Cellini, Roberto
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 489
Abstract: 
We reformulate the monetary policy model of Barro and Gordon (1983a) by using an extended game with observable delay where the hierarchy of play between the central bank and the private sector is endogenous. This allows us to endogenise the institutional setup wherein the monetary policy game takes place. We show that positive inflation may be observed due to mixed strategies rather than time inconsistency.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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