Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159318 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
2003
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 477
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
The existing (static) literature stresses the relevance of capital inputs in determining whether any given merger is (i) profitable and (ii) socially efficient, or not. We take a differential game approach to the same issue, proposing two different models based, respectively, on the capital accumulation dynamics introduced by Ramsey and Solow, respectively. We show that the change in the steady state size of productive plants induced by a merger may play a decisive role in determining whether such a merger is profitable, or socially efficient. However, unlike the static contributions in the same vein, we show that the parameter sets where, respectively, firms find it convenient to merge, and the merger is welfare-increasing, do not intersect at all, irrespectively of the capital accumulation dynamics being considered. This entails that a regulator concerned with the welfare performance of an industry should prevent firms from carrying out any horizontal merger
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