Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159312 
Year of Publication: 
2003
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 471
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
We show that Rholfs's (1974) model is a special case of a spatial monopoly model à la Hotelling (1929) with quadratic transportation costs, where location is exogenous and the good yealds no intrinsic utility. By relaxing these assumptions, we prove that the coordination problem typically thought to affect markets for network goods may not arise in general. Endogenizing location makes it easier for the monopolist to extract consumer surplus but also to cover the entire market.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
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Document Type: 
Working Paper

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