Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159297
Authors: 
Colombo, Luca
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 456
Abstract: 
We investigate a dynamic advertising model where product quality is endogenous. In the differential game between single-product firms, there exists a parameter range where the low-quality firm uses a more efficient advertising technology and earns higher profits than the rival. Moreover, we show that equilibrium qualities are the same under duopoly, multiproduct monopoly and social planning, the only distortion being concerned with output levels.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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