Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159283
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 442
Abstract: 
I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically à la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, as in Solow's (1956) growth model.The leader invests more than the followersò as a result, in steady state the leader's capacity and profits are larger than the follower`s Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat`s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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