Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159272
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2002
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 431
Abstract: 
We consider a nynamic oligopoly where firms invest to increase product differentiation and an externality effect operates in the R&D activity. We compare the steady state solutions under alternative decision rules, namely, the open-loop and the closed-loop Nash equilibrium. Significant differences emerge, concerning the effect of the number of firms upon the optimal degree o product differentiation. We also compare the privat optima with the social optimum, and derive implications concerning the social diserability of different decision rules.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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