Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159256 
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 415
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
I nanlyse two differential games describing electoral campaigns where two candidates invest so as to increase the number of their respective voters.In both cases, parties overinvest and the number of voters is larger than in the social optimum. I extended both models to n candidates, so as to derive the socially optimal number of candidates. This yields non-univocal results, in that the number of candidates maximizing social welfare when a benevolent planner controls their efforts may be higher or lower than the optimal number of candidates given the non-cooperative investment behavior of parties, according to the shape of cost functions and he dynamic behavior of consensus associated with investment.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
363.94 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.