Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Lanzi, Diego
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 405
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms' decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
125.71 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.