Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159246
Authors: 
Lanzi, Diego
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 405
Abstract: 
In this paper competition between two network firms is analysed under two alternative regulatory regimes: a global connectivity regulation (GCR) and an efficient component pricing regulation (ECPRe). Whereas a GCR imposes a full quality of reciprocal interconnection, firms will choose vertical product differentiation in order to lower price competition, while under a ECPRe they will choose the maximum level of services quality and a global degradation of connectivity. Hence firms' decisions about whether or not vertically differentiate products seems to be, at least partially, related to regulatory rules imposed on the market.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
125.71 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.