Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159245
Authors: 
Barigozzi, Francesca
Villeneuve, Bertrand
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 404
Abstract: 
We study a situation where the government influences consumers` behavior by providing both information and incentives. More generally, we propose a methodology for solving models of signl cum cheap talk. We develop the case of consumption choice in the presence of uncertainty nd external effects. The institutions used by delivering biased information to the misbehaver. We study the equilibrium trade-off between informing and giving incentives. Environmental tax policy, anti-smoking campaigns and policy against antibiotics over-consumption serve as illustration.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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