Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159243
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Cellini, Roberto
Year of Publication: 
2001
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 402
Abstract: 
We illustrate two di¤erential oligopoly games using, respectively, the capital accumulation dynamics à la Nerlove-Arrow, and the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. We prove that these games benefit from the property that closed-loop memoryless solutions degenerate into open-loop solutions, since the best reply of a generic firm is independent of the rivals' state variables, which entails that the cross e¤ect from rivals' states to own controls disappears.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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