Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159233 
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 392
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
This paper examines the equivalence among price-modifying and quantity fixing international trade policies in a differential game. We employ two well known capital accumulation dynamics for firms, due to Nerlove and Arrow and to Ramsey, respectively. We show that, in both cases, open-loop and closed-loop Nash equilibria coincide. Under the former accumulation the tariff-quota equivalence holds, but it does not under the latter. Moreover, in the Ramsey model, the country setting the trade policy prefers a quantityequivalent import quota to the adoption of the tariff.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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