Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159232
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 391
Abstract: 
The monopolist's incentives towards product and process innovations are evaluated against the social optimum. The main findings are that (i) the incentive to invest in cost-reducing R&D is inversely related to the number of varieties being supplied at equilibrium, under both regimes; (ii) distortions obtain under monopoly, w.r.t. both the number of varieties and the technology. With substitutes (respectively, complements), the monopolist's product range is smaller (respectively, larger) than under social planning. For any given number of goods, the monopolist operates at a higher marginal cost than the planner does.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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