Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Lambertini, Luca
Iori, Cristina
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 385
We describe a vertically di¤erentiated market where firms choose between activating either independent ventures leading to distinct product qualities, or a joint venture for a single quality. Then, firms either repeat the one-shot Nash equilibrium forever, or behave collusively, according to discount factors. We prove that there exists a parameter region where the joint venture makes it more difficult for firms to sustain collusive behaviour, as compared to independent ventures. Therefore, public policies towards R&D behaviour should be designed so as not to become inconsistent with the pro-competitive attitude characterising the current legislation on marketing practices.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
246.67 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.