Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159220
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Schultz, Christian
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 379
Abstract: 
We investigate the choice of market variable, price or quantity, of an optimal implicit cartel. If the discount factor is high, the cartel can realize the monopoly profit in both cases. Otherwise, it is optimal for the cartel to rely on quantities in the collusive phase if goods are substitutes and prices if goods are complements. The reason is that this minimizes the gains from deviations from collusive play.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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