Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159212
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Lotti, Francesca
Santarelli, Enrico
Year of Publication: 
2000
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 371
Abstract: 
We analyse both the theoretical and empirical side of the issue of R&D spillover. Each firm`s R&D costs are increasing in the amount of the information transmitted to the other firms , and we account for the possibility that the firms control spillovers. We consider both Cournot-Nash and Cornot-Stackelberg behavior. The empirical analyst suggests that (i) firms` control on spillovers is relatively low; (ii) the cost-saving effect associated to joint ventures or R&D cartels is confermed for industries where firms rely mainly upon own R&D as a source of innovation; (iii) R&D cooperation may increase informationsharing, thereby enhancing spillovers.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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