Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159183
Authors: 
Carbonara, Emanuela
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 342
Abstract: 
This paper studies the effect of decentralization on corruption in a hierarchical organization, where decentralization is intended as the delegation of control power to lower levels in a hierarchy. Decentral- ization causes a loss in control to the higher levels, thus curbing their incentives to monitor and detect corrupt activities. However, it also lowers the expected gains from corruption as, following decentralization, the number of individuals who are in charge of a single decision is reduced. It is then more likely that corrupt agents are called to bear the consequences of their actions. Hence, decentralization, although creating agency problems inside an organization, can help in controlling corruption
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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