Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159163
Authors: 
Etro, Federico Gabriele
Year of Publication: 
1998
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 321
Abstract (Translated): 
Theory of tax evasion is reviewed. The Marrelli approach is studied in a more general environment. Indirect tax evasion by firms is extended to the general case of oligopolic markets with a conjectural variations model and either a price discrimination model, considering both ad valorem and specific taxation. From the normative point of view, cut-off rules of tax enforcement are studied and modified inverse elasticity rules for optimal taxation are derived and shown to depend on the level of distortion on the supply side, i.e. on firms` collusion, shifting and tax evasion decisions.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
343.38 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.