Bitte verwenden Sie diesen Link, um diese Publikation zu zitieren, oder auf sie als Internetquelle zu verweisen: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159139 
Autor:innen: 
Erscheinungsjahr: 
1997
Schriftenreihe/Nr.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 296
Verlag: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Zusammenfassung: 
The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared to the setting where firms act as pure profitmaximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
Persistent Identifier der Erstveröffentlichung: 
Creative-Commons-Lizenz: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Dokumentart: 
Working Paper

Datei(en):
Datei
Größe
143.09 kB





Publikationen in EconStor sind urheberrechtlich geschützt.