Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159137
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1997
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 294
Abstract: 
The endogenous choice of timing is discussed in a vertically differentiated duopoly where quality improvement requires a fixed convex cost. The timing decision concerns the quality stage. Using an extended game with observable delay, it is shown that only simultaneous equilibria can arise. This puts into question the ability of Stackelberg games to describe the entry process.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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