Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159107
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 264
Abstract: 
The choice between quantity and price in order to stabilize collusion is modeled here. It is shown that this relocates the prisoners' dilemma backwards, from the market stage to the stage where the market variable is chosen in order to sustain collusion, and where discount rates appear as the payo¤s. Likewise, a prisoners' dilemma arises also when both the market variable and the type of behavior (cooperative or non-cooperative) are simultaneously chosen.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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