Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159104
Authors: 
Fiaschi, Davide
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 261
Abstract: 
In this work we present an endogenous growth model where the Government finances a pubblic good by imposing two taxes, one on the return of the accumlative factor and the other on the return of the not accumulative factor. In an economy where individuals have different initial factor endowments, we determine the fiscal policy that maximizes the growth rate, the poltical equilibrium and , finally, the socially optimal fiscal policy. Because of the heterogeneity of individual's endowments maximizing growth rate does not imply maximum welfare; the political equilibrium fiscal policy does not maximise the growth rate, but it could be socially optimal if the inequality aversion degree is sufficiently high.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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