Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159102
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1996
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 259
Abstract: 
The issue of a cartel stability is investigated in a vertical differentiation framework with convex variable production costs. The behaviour of firms' critical discount factors as the curvature of the cost function varies is analysed, considering either the noncooperative or cooperative qualities, and either price or quantity behaviour. It emerges that, if firms aim at stabilizing the cartel, they are better off paying à la Counot and prefer not to choose the monopoly qualities.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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