Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159078
Authors: 
Ecchia, Giulio
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 235
Abstract: 
We model the introduction of a minimum quality standard in a vertically differentiated duopoly. We extend the literature in determining the standard endogenously, showing that the maximisation of social welfare entails an increase in the surplus accruing to consumers served by the low quality firm and a decrease in the surplus of the remaining consumers. Then, we consider the effects of the standard on the stability of price collusion, proving that the standard makes it more difficult for firms to collude if consumers are sufficiently rich.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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