Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159074 
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 231
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
The present article provides a unied explanation for several phenomena related to advertising by rms. (i) Advertising without repeat purchase of the product, (ii) advertising from established brands, or post-introductory, (iii) simultaneous advertising from low and high quality rms, (iv) its persistence and pro-cyclicality. The explanation is original because it rests upon oligopolistic interaction. The analysis hinges upon two fundamental results. The rst is that advertising allows separation when a signal via prices only does not. The second is that purely dissipative advertising can be used to strategically deter entry. Hence, a link is established between entry deterrence and signaling.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
220.76 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.