Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 227
The incentives to innovate for the incumbent and the entrant in a vertically differentiated market are analised, in the absence of uncertainty. It turns out that if consumers' marginal willingness to pay for quality is sufficiently low, the efficiency effect observationally works so as to favour innovation by the entrant, i.e., competition. Otherwise, it operates to the advantage of the incumbent who acquire the right to innovate, preempting thus the rival.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License:
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
50.86 kB

Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.