Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159069
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 226
Abstract: 
The behaviour of a multiproduct profit seeking monopolist is evaluated vis à vis that of a social planner, in a model where there is a continuum of consumers characterized by different marginal willingness to pay for quality. When the market is completely covered, the monopolist undersupplies all qualities as long as their number is finite. When quality becomes continuous, the richest consumer is provided with the socially optimal quality. Under the alternative assumption of partial market coverage, the monopolist supplies the same qualities as the social planner, restricting though total output. Finally, it turns out that, for a given number of varieties, under partial market coverage the monopolist can make at least as good as under full market coverage, so that she prefers to distort quantity rather than quality.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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