Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159062
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1995
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 219
Abstract: 
The stability of collusion in quantities in a differentiated duopoly is analised, and the result is compared to that emerging in the case of price-setting behaviour. It turns out that quantity collusion is generally better sustained than price collusion, unless products are almost perfect substitutes. Under both quantity and price competition, the social damage associated with collusion is increasing in the degree of substitutability.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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