Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159054
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 211
Abstract: 
The stability of collusion is analysed for a family of demand functions whose curvature is determined by a parameter varying between zero and infinity. If demand is sufficiently convex, firms may prefer to act as quantity setters in order to increase cartel stability. Otherwise, price-setting behaviour enhances their ability to collude.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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