Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159051
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 208
Abstract: 
The effect of delegation on cartel stability is addressed in a duopoly for a homogeneous product, under Cournot competition. The main findings are that if only one firm is managerial, the critical discount factor is increased by the presence of a weight attached to sales, so that cartel stability is decreased, while if both are managerial the opposite holds. As a consequence, the inclusion of sales in both firms' objective function represents an incentive towards collusion.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper
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