Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/159048 
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 205
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
Extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini (1993), we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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