Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159048
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 205
Abstract: 
Extending the analysis carried out in Lambertini (1993), we investigate a horizontally differentiated duopoly in which a public authority can either tax or subsidize firms, in order to induce duopolists to choose the socially optimal locations.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
69.78 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.