Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159036
Authors: 
Cordella, Tito
Datta, Manjira
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 193
Abstract: 
In a simple dynamic general equilibrium model, we introduce the concept of an intertemporal Cournot equilibrium. We show that if the number of strategic agents increases without limit, the intertemporal Cournot equilibrium converges to the intertemporal Walras equilibrium only when the tune horizon for the agent is finite. If the time horizon is infinite, each strategic agent is able to exert nonnegligible market power, no matter how large their number is.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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