Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/159033
Authors: 
Moretto, Michele
Rossini, Gianpaolo
Year of Publication: 
1994
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 190
Abstract: 
Aoki's profit sharing firm organization is associated with the option evaluation model of investment. The firm is endowed with a shut down option it can exercise when the market price, assumed uncertain, falls below a certain trigger level. The distributive parameter is the result of a bargaining process and it is influenced by the shut down option. Workers can delay the firm's shut down by sharing not only profits but also losses. In that case the workers' policy changes both the optimal distributive parameter and the trigger price in a non trivial way. The overall result implies an increase of the profit share going to shareholders as compared to the original Aoki's finding.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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