Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158989
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 146
Abstract: 
In this short note, the behaviour of a monopolist in a horizontally differentiated market is analysed. It turns out that her incentive to differentiate is nihil, while both the optimal location choice and the optimal pricing rule depend on the relative size of the parameters involved in the model.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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