Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158981 
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 138
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
In this paper we study an oligopoly game with a differentiated product using a dynamic evolutionary approach. Firms are allowed to choose between quantity setting and price setting behavior. We find that, under both classical interaction structures, namely 'random mating' and 'paying the field'. Quantity setting behavior (i.e., 'Cournot' behavior), is selected as an asymptotically stable state for the dynamics.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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