Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158978
Authors: 
Lambertini, Luca
Year of Publication: 
1992
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 135
Abstract: 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the interaction between vertical differentiation and contestability in the context of a repeated game with discounting. It is shown that, if consumers retaliate after hit-and-round entry and suppliers and reasonably low discount rates, contestability may not hold.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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