Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158960
Authors: 
Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 117
Abstract: 
Without spillovers and under the "winner-take-all" hypothesis, there is overinvestment in R&D in a non cooperative equilibrium. This is due to the so-called "common pool problem", i.e., duplication of efforts. We show that a public firm can represent a useful instrument in the hands of a policymaker to mitigate such a problem. More precisely, it is provided that, in a mixed duopoly: (i) each firm invest less than in a private duopoly, (ii) although the expected time of innovation is postponed, social welfare is higher than in a private duopoly.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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