Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158953 
Year of Publication: 
1991
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 110
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract (Translated): 
This work extends the analysis of time inconsistency in monetary policy to the case of serial correlation in the level of production. In the one-shot discretionary equilibrium Inflation is higher than in the Barro-Gordon case. Over an infinite horizon, output persistence makes the conditions for a reputational equilibrium more likely to be met.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

Files in This Item:
File
Size
404.72 kB





Items in EconStor are protected by copyright, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise indicated.