Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/158920
Authors: 
Fiorentini, Gianluca
Year of Publication: 
1989
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE 77
Abstract: 
An optimal mechanism fot the provision of impure public inputs to oligopolistic firms is investigated using a three stage game where in the first stage the public agency which provides the public input fixes a non-linear price schedule.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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