Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: https://hdl.handle.net/10419/158920 
Year of Publication: 
1989
Series/Report no.: 
Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 77
Publisher: 
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
Abstract: 
An optimal mechanism fot the provision of impure public inputs to oligopolistic firms is investigated using a three stage game where in the first stage the public agency which provides the public input fixes a non-linear price schedule.
Persistent Identifier of the first edition: 
Creative Commons License: 
cc-by-nc Logo
Document Type: 
Working Paper

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