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Delbono, Flavio
Denicolò, Vincenzo
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Quaderni - Working Paper DSE No. 52
Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di Bologna, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche (DSE), Bologna
In this paper we study a one-shot game of R&D between two price-setting firms that are asymmetrically placed as they produce at different cost levels. The R&D technology displays increasing returns in the form of invisibilities. We show that there exists a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and we prove that the incumbent has never greater probability of winning the patent race than the rival.
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Working Paper

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